Teko holds health data. This page describes how it is protected — and what the app deliberately does not do.
All data stays on the device, in a database encrypted with SQLCipher (AES-256). The key is randomly generated on first launch from the system's cryptographic generator and held in the Android Keystore — never in the code, never in a plain file.
The backup you create is a file encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a password of yours, derived with Argon2id. The header is covered by the integrity check, so a tampered file is rejected rather than half-opened. Without the password the package reveals nothing — neither its contents nor the app's internal structure. Losing the password means losing that backup: it is the price of nobody else being able to open it.
All traffic uses HTTPS, and cleartext traffic is blocked by declarative configuration (Android Network Security Config). Teko Intelligence messages go through a Teko proxy on Cloudflare: the AI provider's access key lives exclusively on the server, never in the app.
The app writes no log file. Recent technical events exist in memory only and pass through an automatic redaction layer that removes personal and health data before any output. In production builds nothing is written to the system console.
On rooted or jailbroken devices Teko does not open: a compromised system breaks the isolation between apps and would allow data to be extracted at runtime. Developer mode on its own only shows a warning — it does not expose data, and blocking it would only produce false positives.
Local accounts can require a password or PIN on launch, with biometrics as a shortcut. The password and PIN are stored only as a hash (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a random per-credential salt), never in clear text.
Write to tekoappsuporte@gmail.com with a description and, if possible, steps to reproduce. We ask that you not disclose publicly before a fix is available.